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Deterrence, Death, and the
Victims of Crime: A Common
Sense Approach
Frank G. Carrington*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of deterrence is one of the most important in the
formulations of the victim advocate, primarily because of two essential premises that underlie the entire field of victim advocacy.
The first, but not necessarily the most important, of these premises concerns the policy that favors assuaging the plight of persons
after they have been victimized. This relief can be provided in a
number of different ways: compensation to innocent victims from
the states; restitution to victims as a condition of granting probation to the criminal; victim counselling;1 and victim/witness assistance programs.' The second premise of victim advocacy, namely,
preventing victimization from ever occurring, is also of critical importance because, obviously, in each instance in which a given act
of victimization is prevented, the palliative measures described
above will not be necessary.
This preventive goal can be effectuated through two types of
activity. First, victim advocates often engage in activity that encourages and assists the potential victim of crime to help himself
in programs such as neighborhood watch, inscription of identifying
serial numbers on personal property, and other citizen crime prevention programs. The second type of activity, with which this Article primarily deals, entails efforts by victim advocates to structure the system to deter would-be criminals from engaging in acts
of victimization. It also requires efforts to deter third parties-for
example, parole officials, whose duties include making decisions
* Executive Director, Victims' Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR) (formerly, the
Crime Victims Legal Advocacy Institute, Inc.). LL.B., 1960, University of Michigan; LL.M.,
1970, Northwestern University.
1. An example of this type of counselling occurs within rape crisis centers.
2. A number of these programs have been established in various prosecutors' offices
across the country.
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that may place dangerous criminals in a position to victimize
again-from acting to the detriment of potential victims.
In sum, the notion of deterrence has assumed critical dimensions in the area of victim advocacy and assistance. Part II of this
Article deals with deterrence generally as a common sense concept
and emphasizes the potential impact that different attitudes toward this concept have on crime victims. Part III then focuses on
particular aspects of deterrence in the capital punishment controversy-again by emphasizing the effect on victims. The final part
of the Article explores a rather new area of the law that applies the
concept of deterrence-by threatening civil liability for gross negligence in the handling and release of prisoners-to third party custodial officials in an attempt to prevent future victimization. The
Article concludes that a common sense approach to the question of
deterrence, rather than one which is based on delaying any decision until all the empirical evidence is compiled, is necessary to
combat the serious crime problem that now faces the country.
II. DETERRENCE: A COMMON SENSE CONCEPT
To deter an individual from a contemplated activity, one must
discourage or restrain that individual from acting or proceeding
through the inducement of fear, doubt, or some sense of deprivation. Deterrence does not act as a direct restraint on conduct;
rather, it works to manipulate the motives or incentives behind
that conduct. The deterrence rationale depends on a conception of
human motivation that is based on a function of cost over gain.
Successful deterrence, therefore, requires that the certainty and
quantum of punishment sufficiently outweigh any expectation of
3
possible gain in the mind of the would-be wrongdoer.
The value of punishment as deterrence rests not on how it affects individual offenders, but on how it affects the future conduct
of the general public. 4 Indeed, in the individual case deterrence already has failed. As one contemporary proponent of deterrence,
Ernest van den Haag, has pointed out, "[d]eterrent effects largely
depend on punishment being meted out according to the crime, so
that a prospective offender can know the likely cost of the offense
and be deterred by it." 5 In other words, members of the public

ING

3. See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CIUMNALS 113-14 (1975); J. WILSON,
ABoUT CmimE 53-55 (1975).
4. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 3, at 60-61.
5. Id. at 61.
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must expect that if they commit a particular crime, their punishment will be comparable to what past offenders have received. If
these offenders repeatedly are paroled, or if they are never apprehended at all, then the ostensible threat of a stiff statutory penalty
has virtually no deterrent effect.6
These notions of a perceived threat and cost versus gain do
not require that potential criminals perform some rational calculation of the-cost/benefit ratio. Irrespective of their intellectual capacity to understand a concept, human beings are capable of responding to threats, learning from experience, and forming habits.
Deterrence, therefore, does not depend on the rationality of a response, but merely on the likelihood and regularity of a response
to a particular threat.'
Some commentators, however, reject this theory of deterrence
for a variety of reasons. One respected federal judge, for example,
dismissed the concept outright in a recent article.9 This criticism of
the deterrence rationale primarily rests on two arguments, neither
of which can withstand careful scrutiny. First, the article advances
the theory that living in the inner city is worse than living in a
prison, and that the threat of incarceration, therefore, has no deterrent effect on those who live in the ghettos. 10 From the premise
that most crime is committed by members of "an underclass of
brutal social and economic deprivation.. . [who] are raised in deteriorating, overcrowded housing . . . [and who] are denied [a]
sense of order, purpose, and self-esteem,""' the article succinctly
concludes that "the threat of prison may be a meaningless deter'1
rent to one whose urban environment is itself a prison. 1
By elevating a metaphorical illustration of the difficulties that

6.
7.

See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 3, at 113. Van den Haag notes,
Prospective offenders need be no more rational than rats are when taught by
means of rewards or punishments to run a maze. Experimenters must calculate the
effects they desire and the means appropriate to achieve them. So must legislators. But
the rats do not calculate, nor do the subjects of legislation need to.

Id.
8. See J. WILSON, supra note 3, at 174-77. Wilson contends that criminals may be less
likely to respond to a given threat because they are willing to run greater risks. Id. at 175.
He also argues that increasing the certainty of punishment deters crime more effectively
than increasing its severity. Id. at 174.
9. Bazelon, Crime: Toward a Constructive Debate, 67 A.B.A.J. 438 (1981).
10. Id. at 440.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Diana Gordon, currently president of the ultrapermissive National
Council on Crime and Delinquency).
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the poor face in attempting to improve their situation to the level
of a literal truth, this argument assumes its conclusion. It boldly
equates the condition of life in the inner cities with the conditions
found in Attica, Green Haven, Soledad, or San Quentin. Indeed, if
this argument were extended to its logical conclusion, it would
identify every person who lives in the ghetto with a felon who is
behind bars because society has deemed that he is too dangerous
to be at liberty. The argument completely ignores the great majority of inner-city dwellers who are decent, hard-working individuals.
These people admittedly live under conditions that are deplorable,
but they do not become criminals; rather, they want nothing more
than to conduct their affairs in relative freedom from criminal
harm. If everyone who resided in the inner city were a criminal and
found prison life preferable to ghetto life, this argument might
have some superficial merit; the facts, however, simply do not support such a proposition.
A positive correlation between poverty and crime undoubtedly
does exist, but, as James Q. Wilson contends, "[tihe desire to reduce crime is the worst possible reason for reducing poverty....
Reducing poverty and breaking up the ghettoes are desirable policies in their own right, whatever their effects on crime. "1 Opponents of deterrence, however, apparently conclude that if poverty
is in some sense a cause of crime, then only the elimination of this
cause will reduce crime. Wilson finds that these opponents have
"become so preoccupied with dealing with the causes of the crime
(whether ... social conditions or police inadequacies) that [they]
have almost succeeded in persuading [them]selves that criminals
are radically different from ordinary people-that they are utterly
indifferent to the costs and rewards of their activities. ' 4 He argues
that no evidence exists to support this conclusion, and that regardless of whether criminals are prone to accept greater risks or have
a weaker sense of morality than an average citizen, "if the expected
cost of crime goes up without a corresponding increase in the expected benefits, then the would-be criminal . . . engages in less
crime." 15
Opponents of deterrence often base a second argument on sta13. J. WILSON, supra note 3, at 203. In response to the notion that poverty causes
crime, Wilson notes that the dramatic increase in crime during the last fifteen years has
occurred "concurrently with a general rise in the standard of living and thus could not be
explained by worsening social conditions." Id. at 74.
14. Id. at 175.

15. Id. at 175-76.
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tistics that purport to prove the ineffectiveness of deterrence; these
statistics support the determination that although both the rates
of incarceration and the lengths of sentences have risen, the crime
rate has not diminished. 16 Thus, the argument concludes, increases
in the probability or length of confinement must not deter offenders. This argument, however, ignores the distinction between the
likelihood of punishment after apprehension and conviction and
the likelihood of actually being apprehended and convicted. The
greatest prerequisite of the deterrence argument is that for an action or threat of action to be effective as a deterrent, those against
whom the threat is directed-in this case, criminals-must perceive the cost of their deeds to be greater than their prospective
gain. In addition, the threat must be total, that is, it consistently
must be credible from the time of arrest to actual imprisonment.
Despite an almost certain probability of being arrested, an offender
will not be greatly deterred from commiting a crime if he foresees
only a negligible chance of going to jail. Conversely, the certainty
of a long prison sentence after conviction is no deterrent to one
who expects never to be apprehended.
Unfortunately, this consistency is absent today. A criminal of
even marginal intelligence must know that although his chances of
going to prison for a longer time are slightly higher now than they
were in the past, his chances of ever being apprehended and convicted-especially in our major metropolitan areas-remain sufficiently minimal that the cost/gain ratio still favors committing the
crime. Indeed, crime has reached such epidemic proportions that
the police simply cannot deal with all of it, and the victims of this
epidemic are bearing the burden. Moreover, our criminal justice
system has instituted such a thicket of restraints on police activity
and such a morass of contrived protections around criminal suspects-for example, the exclusion of evidence and confessions,1 7 an
almost unlimited right to bail despite the commission of other
crimes while on bail,18 and open-ended, post-conviction remedies"'-that we indeed have become, in the words of the Chief Jus16.
17.

See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 9, at 440-41.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961).
18. See, e.g., The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3150 (1976).
19. See Finley, The Appellate System: On a Vulnerable Plateau, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec.
1971, at 19; Hanley, Habeas Corpus Ad Infinitum, NATIONAL SHERIFF, Dec. 1973-Jan. 1974,
at -, 23-24.
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tice, "an impotent society."2 0

Judge Bazelon candidly acknowledged in his article in the
American Bar Association Journal that he has no ready answers
for the country's crime problem."' This author makes the same acknowledgement.2 2 The point of the foregoing discussion is simply
that considering the unparalleled difficulties in apprehending and
convicting criminals, the lack of a significant drop in crime rates as
incarceration and lengths of sentences increase cannot alone support an argument against deterrence.

Many people today talk in reverent terms of empirical evidence-primarily statistics-as if this were the touchstone of any
argument. The conclusion to Judge Bazelon's article typifies this
approach:
We need to know much more about the precise costs of an effective program of deterrence before we can dismiss the recent proposals. At the present
time, however, the case for deterrence has not been convincingly made. After
a comprehensive review of the literature, a panel of the National Academy of
Sciences concluded: "Despite the intensity of the research effort, the empirical evidbnce is still not sufficient for providing a rigorous confirmation of the
existence of a deterrent effect....

Policy makers in the criminal justice sys-

tem are done a disservice if they are left with the impression that the empirical evidence, which they themselves are frequently
unable to evaluate,
18
strongly supports the deterrence hypothesis. 23

Nevertheless, the unifying theme of this Article is that considering
all the variables at issue in such a volatile area as criminal justice,
and taking into account all the statistics for and against deter-

rence, the entire matter ultimately reduces to principles of common sense.
The disagreement over the question of deterrence between the
pragmatists-Wilson, van den Haag, and others2 4 -and the theoreticians-represented by Judge Bazelon and the National Academy
20. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,- American Bar Association Annual
Convention (Feb. 8, 1981), noted in Bazelon, supra note 9, at 438.

21. Bazelon, supra note 9, at 438.
22.

But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT

CRIME: FINAL REPoRT (1981) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. This report contains
a number of recommendations on bail abuse, admissibility of evidence, limitations on postconviction release, and other procedural aspects of the criminal justice system that are
designed to streamline the process and restore a balance between the rights of accused and
convicted criminals and the rights of the law-abiding members of society. The author was a
member of the Task Force and is naturally prejudiced in favor of the Report. Nevertheless,
the recommendations at least are worthy of consideration in dealing with the current crisis
in crime in this country.
23. Bazelon, supra note 9, at 441.
24. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 3; J. WILSON, supra note 3; authorities cited
infra note 32.
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of Science panelists-can be stated clearly and succinctly. The former in effect argue that if the threat of punishment increases, or if
the perceived cost of crime rises to exceed the perceived gain, then
society will deter criminals. The theoreticians, on the other hand,
take a conservative, cautious approach; they apparently would argue that policymakers must study the question of deterrence to a
far greater degree-until they are clearly convinced of its soundness-before they would alter the system toward a more truly deterrent model.
The argument for delay ignores two salient points. First, criminal justice is not a finite science, and deterrence is not a finite
concept. Theorists probably will never know with certainty the inner and outer limits of the deterrence model as a solution to the
crime problem. This fundamental reality is the reason that this Article favors a common sense view of deterrence. Since no other approach has produced the desired results, a return to traditional notions about human behavior appears to be the only sensible
alternative. Although some people might view this response as simplistic, the cost versus gain rationale is intrinsically logical, and no
reason exists not to attempt to apply these principles to criminal
justice, particularly when the more complex alternatives have
failed demonstrably.
Second, from a pragmatic point of view, crime has reached
such alarming proportions that society cannot afford the time that
would be necessary to perform leisurely studies of deterrence-gathering empirical data on a gradual basis until the more
learned professors are satisfied that deterrence works. Medical
scientists, for example, have worked for years to produce cures for
chronic, preexisting maladies such as the common cold, influenza,
and arthritis that do not place the patient's life in danger. Studies
and tests are time controlled; they are conducted first in vitro and
then in vivo by beginning with laboratory animals and progressing
to human experiments only under the most rigid conditions. This
approach is known as the scientific method, and it is perfectly
proper when the urgency is not immediate. The situation, however,
is entirely different in emergency circumstances caused by a raging
killer epidemic such as a plague or a new and deadly virus that is
decimating the population. At this point, any potential remedy
that appears likely to cure the disease or prevent its spread will be
25
used without first undergoing rigid testing in clinical conditions.
25.

In the spring of 1976, for example, the possibility of a new strain of an influenza
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The analogy between the current epidemic of crime and a medical
emergency is in no way attenuated, and society thus needs to
adopt measures that will abate the alarming rise in crime immediately-not some distant point in the future when everyone concludes that the concept of deterrence breeds no harmful side
effects.
As individuals continue to become victims of crime, society's
attempts to Solve the problem remain frustrated because of the
tension between the need for immediate action and the quest for
reasonable certainty about the effectiveness of deterrence. No single aspect of the criminal justice system highlights this tension
more clearly than the arguments for and against deterrence and
the dealth penalty, which this Article discusses below. The thesis
of the Article is that the plight of the victim should be society's
overriding consideration, and that the only viable solution to the
present stalemate lies in a common sense approach to deterrence
and capital punishment.
III. DEATH AND DETERRENCE:- THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
CONTROVERSY

Proponents of the deterrent value of capital punishment-or,
for that matter, any other aspect of deterrence-find themselves in
the unenviable position of having to prove a negative. If a person is
deterred from doing something, then, by definition, he does not do
it. Thus, the numbers of people who refrained from committing
felonies because of their fear of execution are difficult to ascertain.
Rarely does a resident drop by the station house in his local police
precinct to confide to the desk sergeant, "You know, I was planning to kill my wife for the insurance money, but the thought of
the death penalty kept me from doing it." Homicide figures in the
United States roughly indicate how many people obviously were
not deterred from killing, but the number of those who actually
were deterred remains-and must remain-incalculable.
virus-commonly known as swine flu-creating an epidemic among the American public
during the following winter concerned United States public health officials. Researchers
soon developed an effective vaccine, but it had potentially serious side effects for various
segments of the population. Despite a sharp debate among policymakers about these risks
compared to the benefits of a national immunization program, see Tn.M, April 26, 1976, at
36, President Ford announced a $135 million program to innoculate the entire United States
population. At that time, the Food and Drug Administration, which normally is the body
that must approve such drugs before they are made available to the public, had neither
tested the vaccine nor certified it as safe and effective. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1976, at 1, col.
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This discussion is not intended to suggest that those who are
interested in statistics and empirical evidence have remained
uninvolved in the deterrent controversy; indeed, a spirited, if
rather arcane, debate currently is being waged among those who
would seek to translate numbers and other variables into conclusions about the deterrent value of capital punishment. Of course,
any detailed description of these statistical arguments about the
death penalty and its deterrent effect is far beyond the scope of
this Article. Briefly, sociologists and behavioral scientists initiated
the discussion and purported to show-by comparing homicide
rates in contiguous states that had adopted opposing positions on
the death penalty-that capital punishment was not a crime deterrent.2 6 Students of the crime problem accepted these findings almost without reservation for a good number of years.
The debate subsequently widened with the entry of a new
group of academic theorists: the econometricians. Using an
econometric model that identified the various relevant determinants of murder, Isaac Ehrlich, a respected economist and opponent of the death penalty, published a paper in 19758 criticizing

the sociologists' and behavioral scientists' method and indicating
that each actual execution between 1933 and 1967 could have deterred an average of eight murders. 9 Ehrlich's conclusion drew immediate criticism,30 to which he responded,31 and the statistical
warfare has continued up to the present.3 2 The inconclusive results
26. See, e.g., J. SELLIN,

THE DEATH PENALTY

34 (1959).

27. See, e.g., W. RECKLESS, THE CRIME PROBLEM 508 (4th ed. 1967). But see van den
Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. (1969), reprinted in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 111 (J. McCafferty ed. 1972).
28. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 (1975). An amicus curiae brief in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153 (1976), cited Ehrlich's article. In many legal circles, it is credited with influencing the
Court in its holding in Gregg that carefully drawn statutes providing for the death penalty
are constitutional. For accounts of the Supreme Court's inconsistent holdings regarding the
death penalty beginning with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in which the Court

held state death penalty statutes constitutionally invalid as "arbitrary and discriminatory,"
through Gregg, in which it reinstated the death penalty, see F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL
NOR UNUSUAL 143-92 (1977); M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (1973).
29. Ehrlich, supra note 28, at 398, 414.
30. Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975).
31. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply, 67 AM. ECON. REv.
452 (1977).
32. See generally F. CARRINGTON, supra note 28, at 82; Ehrlich, Capital Punishment

and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741
(1977); Ehrlich & Gibbons, On the Measurement of the DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 65 J.

LEGAL STUD.

35 (1977); Passell & Taylor, The
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of this debate reinforce the contention that if the statistical theorticians cannot agree-based on the best empirical evidence-whether capital punishment deters murderers, then perhaps returning to a common sense evaluation of the question,
which all citizens are capable of making, will be a more feasible
and productive approach to the problem.
This common sense perspective begins with a concession from
capital punishment proponents that the threat of the death penalty cannot and will not deter every murderer. Crimes of passion,
crimes committed by the certifiably insane, and crimes calculatedly
undertaken for revenge are all examples of murders that no known
threat can deter. Notwithstanding this admission, however, the
proposition does not follow that because capital punishment does
not deter all murderers, it deters no murderers. Justice Stewart
succinctly articulated this theme in Gregg v. Georgia,33 in which
the Supreme Court affirmed-with Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting-three state death penalty statutes. Justice Stewart
reasoned,
Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not
function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no
convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view. We
may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who
act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect.
But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire,
where the possible penalty of
death may well enter the cold calculus that
3
precedes the decision to act. '

The first noteworthy aspect of the common sense analysis of
the death and deterrence question is a simple cause and effect relationship. The several states quit executing murderers in 1966, a
year in which slightly more than 10,000 murders were recorded. 5
This hiatus-initially de facto, but after 1972, de jure3 6 -l-asted approximately ten years, and during that period, the number of
murders doubled to over 20,000 in 1976.87 Undoubtedly, other factors also contributed to this increase, including population growth,
deteriorating urban conditions, and an increasing disrespect for the
law. The fact remains, however, that abandonment of the supreme
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 445 (1977); A.
Symposium: Capital Punishment in the United States, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1978).
33. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34. Id. at 185-86.
35.
36.
37.

See F. CARRINGTON, supra note 28, at 86.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
F. CARRINGTON, supra note 28, at 86.
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penalty corresponded to a spectacular and unprecedented rise in
the number of capital murders. At the very least, this ten year period of enlightenment-or softness-toward capital punishment
created no parallel sense of gratitude in the hearts of potential killers. On the contrary, a more reasonable conclusion is that these
people cynically and calculatedly took advantage of the new permissiveness. With the death penalty defunct and state parole laws
allowing for release in a relatively few years, they justifiably believed that the murder of the victims of an armed robbery to avoid
being identified, for example, was not an unacceptable risk considering the potential gain.
Another type of input offers additional support for the proposition that the relationship between the abandonment of capital
punishment and the rise in the number of murders is one of cause
and effect. Because actual thought processes and motivations are
necessarily private matters that others can only approximate,
criminals themselves may provide unique insights into their feelings about the death penalty. In 1970 and 1971 the Los Angeles
Police Department surveyed persons whom they had arrested for
violent crimes, but who either had carried no weapons, had not
used their weapons, or had carried inoperative weapons.3 8 Of the
ninety-nine criminals who responded to the question about why
they had not killed, or, alternatively, why they deliberately had
avoided placing themselves in a position where they could have
killed, their responses indicated that fifty percent were deterred by
fear of the death penalty; about eight percent were unaffected by
the death penalty because it was not being enforced; ten percent
were undeterred by the death penalty and would kill whether it
was enforced or not; and approximately thirty-two percent were
unaffected by the death penalty because they would not carry a
weapon under any circumstances, primarily because of a fear either
of being injured themselves or of injuring someone else.3 9 Thus,
one out of every two persons who had avoided circumstances in
which they might have killed provided the best possible empirical
basis for believing in the deterrent effect of the death penalty-their own statements that a fear of the gas chamber gov40
erned their actions.
38.

Los Angeles Police Dep't, A Study on Capital Punishment (February 1971).

39.

Id.

40. This study was one of the rare instances in which the proponents of deterrence
actually were able to "prove the negative." In discussions with capital punishment ex-

perts-both retentionists and abolitionists-the author often has encountered the caveat
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A dissenting opinion in a capital punishment case written by
the late Justice Marshall McComb of the California Supreme
Court4 1 provides another example of the average criminal's perception of the death penalty's deterrent effect. To demonstrate the
deterrence factor, Justice McComb collected statements from
police files of fourteen arrested criminals who had failed to use
deadly force in the commission of their crimes because of their fear
of being executed. The police had arrested one of these criminals
for assault with a knife. She told investigating officers: "'Yeh, I cut
him and I should have done a better job. I would have killed him
but I didn't want to go to the gas chamber.'"" In another case the
police arrested three persons, two of whom had prior criminal
records, for robbery. Using toy pistols, these offenders had forced
their victims into a back room and bound them. When the invetigating officers asked them why they had used toy guns instead of
real ones, all three agreed that "'real guns were too dangerous, as
if someone were killed in the commission of the robberies, they
would all receive the death penalty.' ,,43 In yet another example
cited by Justice McComb, an ex-convict with at least four aliases
and a felony record that dated from 1941 was arrested for robbery.
He had used guns in prior robberies in other states, but only pretended to carry a gun in the robbery in question. He told investigating officers that although he had spent only one month in the
state, he had known about the California death penalty. When
questioned about the gun bluff, he said, "'I knew that if I used a
real gun and that if I shot someone in a robbery, I might get the
death penalty and go to the gas chamber.' ,44 Overall, the offenders demonstrated an awareness of the potential penal consequences
of their conduct in each of the fourteen cited cases, and they all
intentionally placed themselves in a situation in which an unacceptably adverse result-namely, capital punishment-could not
possibly occur. Justice McComb concluded from this evidence that
that "these people were simply telling the cops what they thought they wanted to hear."
This explanation for the results of the survey might well be accurate, but the fact remains
that the condition which gave rise to the study-that the weapon either was not used or
could not be used-existed before the criminals knew that they would be apprehended,
much less before they knew whether they would be questioned about their failure to use the
weapon.
41. People v. Love, 56 Cal. 2d 720, 366 P.2d 33, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1961).
42. Id. at 735, 366 P.2d at 41, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (McComb, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the death penalty was indeed an effective deterrent."5
The final argument in this common sense analysis of deterrence and the death penalty concerns those people who are most
directly affected by the acts of violent criminals-the murder victims themselves. If one concedes that neither side in this debate
can prove conclusively that capital punishment does or does not
deter murderers, then two-and only two-options remain: either
the death penalty does not deter any would-be murderers or it deters at least some of them. If the first possibility proves to be true,
then the invocation of capital punishment will not save the lives of
any potential victims. Society, however, will be rid of some of its
most dangerous predators, and the possibility that these people
will kill again should they be released or escape will be foreclosed.
On the other hand, if the second possibility is true, then the deterrent effect of making the threat of execution a credible one actually will save a given number of innocent victims from being killed.
The essential question regarding the acceptance of a death
penalty with an unproved deterrent value, therefore, becomes
whether society should favor the lives of convicted murderers over
the lives of innocent victims. Viewed from the perspective of its
potential to spare lives, one unquestionably can save convicted
murderers by not executing them, but only at a continued high
cost in terms of the lives of the innocent. On the other hand, although saving the lives of innocent victims by executing criminals
may be less certain, the costs to society of not doing so are also
much more severe. Simply stated, a common sense, victim-oriented
approach resolves the uncertainty about deterrence in favor of the
potential victims rather than the convicted criminals.
IV.

PosITIVE DETERRENCE THROUGH THIRD PARTY VICTIMS'
RIGHTS LITIGATION

This part of the Article deals with an area of the law that advocates of victims' rights are just now beginning to accept: litigation on behalf of a crime victim against negligent, or grossly negligent, correctional officials.4 This approach focuses on the concept
of positive deterrence, which relies upon the threat of legal action
to eliminate victimization opportunities for potential repeat of45. Id. at 734-35, 366 P.2d at 40-41, 16 Cal. Rptr. 784-85 (McComb, J., dissenting).
46. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the term "correctional officials" includes
parole boards, probation officers, wardens, sheriffs, and anyone else who has a duty to handle prisoners in some manner.
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fenders. By committing one or more violent crimes-murder, rape,
robbery, mayhem, kidnapping with violence, and aggravated assault-an individual unequivocally demonstrates that he is a danger to the community. When this individual is apprehended, convicted, or confined to a mental institution, the government takes
full control of him through some form of incarceration or commitment. Similarly, the government assumes partial responsibility for
an individual when it places him on parole, probation, work release, or the like. If correctional officials release the individual or
permit him to escape under circumstances that constitute some
form of negligence, or if they negligently supervise or control him,
then these officials arguably should be held liable for any injury
that results from the individual's future violent conduct. Liability
also could be imposed for a negligent failure to warn certain potential victims either of threats against them or of the offender's dangerous tendencies.
Under this theory of liability, therefore, either the victim or
the victim's survivors avoid suing the perpetrators of the crime and
instead proceed against those third parties whose negligence-or
gross negligence-actually put the offender in a position to victimize. According to the theory, the deterrence value arises from the
perceived likelihood that the custodial officials or the government
entities for which they work will be held civilly liable for gross negligence in the release or handling of prisoners. The theory holds
that this threat will ensure-through the mechanism of enlightened self-interest-that these officials make their decisions and
dispositions with the proper regard for the safety of society. By
giving officials an incentive to be wary in their decisionmaking, and
by deterring them from taking unnecessary risks, this approach
may well prevent a good many of the current victimizations.
Several courts have begun to implement this deterrent rationale by permitting actions against correctional officials. Grimm v.
Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles,47 for example, which the
Supreme Court of Arizona decided in 1977, is a landmark case in
this area. In 1973 Mitchell Blazak robbed a tavern in Tucson and
killed John Grimm in the process. Blazak was a parolee whom the
Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles had released after he had
served one-third of a 1967 sentence for armed robbery and assault
with intent to kill. The Parole Board had released Blazak despite
his criminal record dating from 1961, which included-besides the
47.

115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) (en banc).
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armed robbery and assault with intent to kill-convinctions for
burglary (twice), parole violation, and possession of marijuana.48 In
addition, the Board arguably possessed other evidence about the
danger to society of releasing Blazak. The court in its opinion summarized eight different psychiatrists' prison evaluations that described him as
"an extremely dangerous person who should not be free in society until some
major psychological changes take place." He is a paranoid schizophrenic
whose psychosis prevents him from distinguishing between right and wrong
and from controlling his conduct. He has never made an adequate adjustment
to society for any prolonged period and is unlikely to change. He has a definite potential for violence .4

In any event, the Board released Blazak after he had served
only a fraction of his sentence, and shortly thereafter he murdered
Mr. Grimm. Mrs. Grimm sued the members of the Parole Board
for the wrongful death of her husband based on their gross negligence in the release; the Board defended on the grounds of an absolute immunity for public officials. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the Parole Board members owed a duty to
individuals when they make a decision "to release on parole a prisoner with a history of violent and dangerous conduct." 50 In holding
that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action-subject, of course, to
proof of all the other elements of actionable negligence-the court
rejected the Board's absolute immunity rationale and affirmed the
need for some method of accountability for bureaucratic decisionmaking. The court stressed the need to deter grossly negligent official action:
We have come to this conclusion because of the increasing power of the
bureaucracy-the administrators-in our society. The authority wielded by
so-called faceless bureaucrats has often been criticized. . . . While society
may want and need courageous, independent policy decisions among high
level government officials, there seems to be no benefit and, indeed, great
potential harm in allowing unbridled discretion without fear of being held to
account for their actions for every single public official who exercises discretion. The more power bureaucrats exercise over our lives, the more we need
some sort of ultimate responsibility to lie for their most outrageous conduct.
There may even be some deterrent value in holding officials responsible for
shocking outrageous actions. In any case, democarcy by its very definition
implies responsibility. In this day of increasing power wielded by governmental officials, absolute immunity for nonjudicial, nonlegislative officials is outmoded and even dangerous. 5 '
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

262,
263,
267,
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564
564
564
564

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
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at
at
at

1229.
1230.
1234.
1233 (citations omitted).
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Citing the Arizona statute that set forth the criteria for parole release, 52 the court held that the Board's action in granting parole
resulted in a voluntary assumption of responsibility over the convict.5 3 The court reasoned that the supervision of a person having
dangerous tendencies raises a duty to individual members of the
general public and renders the Board liable for injury to individuals stemming from "grossly negligent or reckless release of a highly
-dangerous prisoner." 54 Under these circumstances, the court held
that
members of the Board are under a duty to inquire further before releasing
the prisoner .... If the entire record of the prisoner reveals violent propensities and there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a belief that he has
changed, then a decision to release the prisoner would be grossly negligent or
reckless.55

Taylor v. State,8 a 1973 jury verdict in a lower court case in
the State of Washington, reached a result similar to that in
Grimm. In Taylor the warden of the maxi-security state penitentiary in Washington had instituted an ill-conceived and unauthorized "take-a-lifer-to-dinner" program, under which prisoners serving life sentences were permitted to go to dinner outside the prison
as a rehabilitative device. One of the beneficiaries of this program
was a convict serving a life term who had a prior criminal record of
forty-one felony convictions and seventeen escape attempts. The
prisoner went to dinner at the home of an unarmed prison baker,
crawled out the bathroom window, and subsequently murdered
Mr. Taylor and wounded his wife during an armed robbery. Mrs.
Taylor's suit against both the State of Washington and the warden-in his personal capacity-resulted in a jury award of
$186,000.57
Grimm and Taylor are typical of those cases in which either
victims or their survivors sue correctional officials for gross negligence in the handling of convicted criminals that results in harm to
third parties. Despite several decisions in which courts have denied
52.

Id. at 262, 564 P.2d at 1229. The Arizona statute provides,

If it appears to the board of pardons and paroles, from a report by the department of
corrections, or upon the application by the prisoner for a release on parole, that there is
a reasonable probability that the applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, then the board may authorize the release of the applicant upon parole.
ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-412 (1976).
53. 115 Ariz. at 267, 564 P.2d at 1234.
54.

Id. at 267, 564 P.2d at 1234.

55. Id.
56. No. 211-30 (Pierce County, Washington, Super. Ct., September 1, 1973).
57. Id.
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recovery-principally on the traditional grounds of sovereign immunity 5 -- these cases represent a discernible trend in the courts
toward permitting recovery when the requisite elements of a negligence or gross negligence cause of action are present.59 This line of
cases is presented solely to illustrate the potential-and growing
trend-for victims to utilize the civil courts in lawsuits against
third parties, not only to vindicate their own rights-either as victims themselves or as victims' survivors-but also, and perhaps
more importantly, to use the law itself as a deterrent against those

who are far too willing to experiment with the safety and security
of the innocent to advance their own rehabilitative theories.6 0

This application of the deterrence concept to tort litigation
presents a difficult theoretical problem of determining the proper
standard of care that correctional officials owe to each member of
the public. In many, if not most, personal injury lawsuits, the connection between the defendant's action and the plaintiff's injury is
relatively easy to foresee. In cases against correctional officials,
however, the defendants are not the actors who directly cause the
injury; rather, their negligence merely places the criminal in a posi58. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). But see Pate v. Alabama Bd.
of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Thompson v. County of Alameda,
27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980); Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa
1977); Carrington, Martinez Ruling Won't Bar Suits on Negligent CustodialReleases, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 26, col. 1.
59. See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981) (reargued en banc
Sept. 24, 1981); Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd en banc,
580 F.2d 647 (1978); Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976); Patricia J. v.
Rio Linda Union School Dist., 61 Cal. App. 3d 278, 132 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1976). See generally
Carrington, The Crime Victims Legal Advocacy Institute:A Victims' Legal Rights Organization Is Formed in Virginia, 6 VA. B.A.J. 4 (1980); Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation:
A Wave of the Future, 11 U. RICH. L. Rzv. 447 (1977); Carrington, Victims' Rights: A New
Tort, TRIAL, June 1978, at 39; Rottenberg, Crime Victims FightingBack, PARADE MAGAZINz,
March 16, 1980, at 1; Comment, Victims' Suits Against Government Entities and Officials
for Reckless Release, 29 Am. U.L. Rav. 595 (1980); Barbash, Victims' Rights: New Legal
Weapon, Washington Poet, Dec. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
60. Areas other than the handling of prisoners also have utilized the concept of positive deterrence through victim lawsuits against negligent third parties. For example, victims
who have been injured because of a failure of security on leased premises have successfully
sued and recovered. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978); O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977). Likewise, innkeepers have been held liable for the failure to provide proper security for guests who were
victimized. See, e.g., Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). Finally, owners of premises have been held liable to business invitees. See,
e.g., Quinn v. Smith, 57 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1932); Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, 65 Cal. 2d 114,
416 P.2d 793, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1966); Earle v. Colonial Theater Co., 82 Mich. App. 54, 266
N.W.2d 466 (1978).
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tion to victimize. Thus, the harmful result is not as immediately
foreseeable, and a simple negligence standard arguably is
inappropriate.
Correctional officials perform the most difficult and demanding job in criminal justice today. To second-guess every disposition
made in good faith by these officials by permitting civil lawsuits
might unfairly burden and unduly restrict their decisionmaking
process. At the same time, a standard requiring intentional malefaction provides too little control over their actions. The proper
balance between these two competing considerations, therefore,
lies in the concept of gross negligence as a prerequisite for liability.
Indeed, almost every court that has held correctional officials liable
has based its decision on a finding of gross negligence. 1 The court
in Grimm, for example, relied on this standard; 6 2 it reasoned that
the standard struck "the proper balance between the competing
interests. The public has an interest in protection from premature
release of highly dangerous prisoners as well as an interest in holding public officials responsible for outrageous conduct. The Board
members have an interest in freedom from suit for reasonable decisions."' s Similarly, the recently published final report of The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime also recommended
a gross negligence standard in these situations." For these reasons,
a gross negligence standard, which requires a higher degree of culpability than a simple good faith mistake, strikes a proper balance
between the unfettered discretion of correctional officials and the
policy against second-guessing mistaken dispositions that are made
reasonably in good faith. In any event, the wave of victim litigation
against third parties is not likely to abate-nor should it. As long
as the courts continue to be vigilant in maintaining an appropriate
balance between competing societal interests, this type of litigation
is the kind of benign, positive deterrence that furthers the policy
goals of the American criminal justice system.
61. See, e.g., Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564 P.2d
1227, 1234 (1977) (en banc).
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 268, 564 P.2d at 1235 (footnote omitted).

64.

TASK FORCE REPORT,

supra note 22, Recommendation 63. Recommendation 63

states that "the Attorney General should study the principle that would allow for suits
against appropriate federal governmental agencies for gross negligence involved in allowing
early release or failure to supervise obviously dangerous persons or for failure to warn expected victims of such dangerous persons." Id. (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to demonstrate that only a paucity
of actual knowledge is available on the concept of deterrence. Although the theory of cost versus gain-a pure threat of sanction as
a deterrent to criminal activity-is logically compelling, hardly
anything in this area can be proven even by a preponderance of
the evidence, much less with mathematical certainty. The question
that society must address, therefore, is whether to accept the reasonable, but concededly unprovable, proposition that a would-be
criminal's motivation to commit lawless and violent acts will diminish in direct proportion to the extent that the criminal justice
system provides a credible threat of swift and certain apprehension
and punishment. The only alternative solution apparently is to
5
wait-as the theoreticians cited above would advocate l-until
the
concept of deterrence can be proven empirically. The thesis of this
Article is that this latter approach is in large part responsible for
the lamentable situation in which our criminal justice system now
finds itself. The time has come for society to adopt a common
sense approach to the question of deterrence and to return the
rights of innocent victims to their rightful position as the principal
priority of the American criminal justice system.

65.

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

